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OVERVIEW
The context
– telecommunications
– New Zealand
Three eras
– from government monopoly to light-handed regulation 1987-
2001
– return to industry-specific regulation 1999-2005
– reinstitution of government control 2005-7
Relative performance
– transaction costs (overheads)
– consumer welfare (prices, products, availability, quality, uptake)
– competition (entry, timing, market shares)
– investment (timing, incentives, actual expenditure)
CONTEXT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
High fixed/sunk costs
Network industry
Natural monopoly tendencies
– implications for welfare
• allocative efficiency
• productive efficiency
• dynamic efficiency
– competition FOR the market (‘winner takes all’) v ‘missing 
market (nobody invests and all welfare foregone)
Policy-maker’s dilemma
– maximising total welfare from current technologies whilst 
ensuring timely investment in next generation technologies
POLICY-MAKER’S OPTIONS
Public ownership and regulatory barriers to entry
– investment capital from compulsory taxation
– allocative efficiency advantages; 
– but poor in productive, dynamic efficiency
– often used to achieve wider social objectives
Private ownership, unrestricted entry  and industry-specific 
regulation
– productive efficiency advantages from private ownership
– depends upon the type of regulation, but
• maybe some allocative efficiency advantages
• certainly higher administrative overheads
• incentives must be carefully designed to ensure ongoing 
investment and new technologies (risks of ‘regulatory failure’
significant)
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT circa 1987
Pursuit of increased efficiency
– ‘failure’ of regulated private monopoly franchises (US, 
Canada)
– ‘failure’ of government ownership (UK, most of Europe, 
Australia, New Zealand)
Desire for increased competition
– a means to the end of increased efficiency
But how to achieve it given industry characteristics?
A ‘natural experiment’ for policy-makers
– ‘competition’ for new ways to govern industry interactions
CONTEXT: NEW ZEALAND
1984
– constitutional and foreign currency crisis 
– led to “one of the most notable episodes of liberalisation that 
history has to offer” Henderson (1995)
Political and public policy consensus
– stable, credible, mutually consistent macroeconomic policies
– efficient allocation of resources
– achieving a competitive environment “wherever possible”
– markets operating relatively free from government 
intervention 
Shaped policy approach of NZ’s contribution to the 
experiment
NEW ZEALAND’S ECONOMY
Small size, small population, low population density, 
geographical isolation, challenging terrain, thin capital 
markets, highly-concentrated industries
Predominant competition issue for any industry:
– elimination of market power per se not feasible
• pursuit of scale & scope economies makes it inevitable
– ex ante regulation costly per capita/per account
• also, negative effect on private sector investment incentives 
– challenge is to design framework where dominant parties 
can trade, but discourages exertion of dominance
‘LIGHT-HANDED’ REGULATION
‘Lightly regulated’ but far from ‘unregulated’
Commerce Act 1986
– dominance permitted, but punished if exercised
Natural monopoly characteristics of former state-owned 
utilities required further safeguards
Specific information disclosure
– transparency of performance
– facilitates negotiations with businesses
Threat of further regulation if market dominance is 
abused
– Part IV of the Commerce Act
Specific contractual or legislated obligations
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1987
Telecommunications separated from post and banking 
into arms-length state-owned corporation 1 April 1989
– with view to privatisation
Consistent with ‘light-handed’ principles
Using an industry-specific regulator (e.g. Australia) or 
structural separation (e.g. United States) rejected on 
efficiency grounds
Legislative protections removed
Reporting obligations
– transparent financial statements; regular reports to Ministry of
Commerce; contracts offering discounts of more than 10% of 
listed prices to be disclosed
PRIVATISATION 1990
Consortium – Bell Atlantic & Ameritech 12 September 
($4.25 billion)
– requirement to sell majority of shares to private investors –
achieved 19 July 1991
– NZ’s largest listed company (20-25% NZX capitalisation)
Reporting obligations transferred
‘Kiwi Share’ obligations
– ‘price cap’ on residential rentals 
• CPI – x  where x = 0 
– residential ‘free local calling’
• some of largest local calling regions in the OECD
– residential ‘universal service’
• rural rentals no higher than urban rentals
LITIGATION 1991-4
Clear entered market 1991
– national, 20%, international 23% m/share within 5 years
– local interconnection agreement (ICA) sought 1991
S36 breach alleged
– High Court (no)
– Court of Appeal (yes)
– Privy Council (no)
Crux issue was use of ECPR pricing rule
– ruled a legitimate pricing methodology under Commerce Act
– but may be inefficient under some circumstances
Tension: Competition Law processes may not always 
deliver efficiency-raising outcomes
OTHER CHALLENGES TO ‘LIGHT-HANDED’
REGIME
Long time taken to reach settlement
– interim uncertainty prevented further entry occurring
Courts can adjudicate only the behaviour contested
– cannot consider other factors (e.g. counter-offers)
‘Kiwi Share’ retail obligations create pricing dilemmas in 
upstream markets
– how to price upstream elements so
a) Telecom can recover fair costs of social obligation
b) efficient competitive entry in downstream markets is 
facilitated
1995 Inquiry recommended no changes 
(Treasury/Ministry of Commerce) 
PATTERN OF LITIGIOUS INTERACTION
1996 Telecom/Clear Interconnect Agreement
– 5 year deal challenged after 5 months
– Clear withheld payments pending another S36 case
– Telecom sought contractual performance via High Court
– Court ruled Clear could withhold until S36 case settled
• efficiency consequences – Telecom underwriting Clear’s 
competitive activities; implications for Telecom’s future investment 
plans 
Further tension between court adjudications and pursuit of 
efficiency (‘competition’ vs ‘efficiency)
In the end, S36 action not completed
– contract went full 5 years
– changing market circumstances changed payoffs (‘ISP Wars’)
‘ISP WARS’
Post 1994
– flurry of market entry once court decision increased 
certainty 
– arrival of the commercial internet induced more entry (ISPs)
Changing traffic patterns
– ‘free’ local calling under Kiwi Share – increased usage at no 
cost to consumers
– altered payoffs from Telecom/Clear ICA
• strategic interactions from contractual arbitrage
• gains shared with consumers via low ISP prices – price wars 
amongst ISPs, emergence of ‘free’ ISPs
TELECOM PSTN TRAFFIC 1996-2003
DIAL-UP USAGE PER ISP ACCOUNT
RESPONSES
Telecom
1. Stop the cash flows to non-Telecom ISPs (0867 package)
2. Migrate internet users off the PSTN as soon as possible –
early implementation of ADSL
• January 1999 – 3rd in the OECD
• nationwide – 85% of customer lines by 2002
• high quality (2Mbps base offering)
• low prices (3rd-lowest in the OECD in 2000, taking into 
account speed etc.) 
• universal pricing
Commerce Commission
– laid S36 breach charges re 0867 (even though Minister 
satisfied)
– case still to be heard 8 years later
PERFORMANCE OF THE ‘LIGHT-HANDED’
REGIME
Dynamic efficiency
– timely investment in new technologies
Allocative efficiency
– low prices (absolute and relative) across all technologies
– role of ‘Kiwi Share’
Competition
– highly competitive ISP market
– multiple technologies
– dominant firm, competitive fringe disciplines
NZ REAL RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE PRICE 
INDEX 1991-2001
OECD TELEPHONE CHARGE TIME SERIES
A TRUIMPH FOR ‘LIGHT-HANDED’
REGULATION?
Procedural concerns still remained
– court cases took long time to be resolved/create uncertainty
– tension between ‘increased competition’ and ‘increased 
efficiency’ remains unresolved
Telecom still had a dominant position in the market
‘Kiwi Share’ obligations still causing distortions
– who should bear costs?
– how is it distorting entry decisions?
• accusations of predatory pricing when Telecom matched 
Saturn prices in Wellington 
• ‘ISP wars’ would have been muted by per-minute charging
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC REGULATION
Commerce Act changes 2001
Ministerial Inquiry 2000
– Government policy “to ensure that the regulatory 
environment delivers cost-efficient, timely and innovative 
telecommunications services on an ongoing fair and 
equitable basis to all existing and potential users”
– recommended industry-specific regulator despite lack of 
evidence that the previous regime had ‘failed’
• cost-based pricing (TSLRIC) prescribed for designated services
• but designation to be made only where indicated on efficiency 
criteria)
Telecommunications Act 2001
– instituted regulator, Kiwi Share obligations separated out and 
levied ex post as a charge on all industry participants
‘LIGHT’ INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC REGULATION
Commissioner appointed December 2001, took up 
duties March 2002
First decisions released November 2002
Multiple determinations sought in 2003
– TelstraClear, iHug, CallPlus, Compass, WorldXChange
– at same time as TSO determination, LLU inquiry
– each determination follows court-like process (but all 
contracts, rather than a representative one) taken to 
determination
– most determinations for 12 month period – redeterminations
sought almost as soon as the original determinations 
finalised
– easy access to a regulatory determination removes most of 
the incentives for the parties to commit effort to resolving the
issues independently
IMPROVED PERFORMANCE?
Transaction costs
– Commission’s 2003 budget double that anticipated by 2000 
Inquiry
Entrant investment, dynamic efficiency
– access to Telecom wholesale products dilutes competitor 
incentives to invest in alternative platforms
Timeliness
– TSO decisions, mobile termination taking longer than 1991-4 
court case
– no services provided until determination is made
• cf ‘ISP Wars’ when Telecom and TelstraClear fighting 
simultaneously in courtroom and market
– ex post levying means no certainty of obligation for entrants 
– how to make entry decision/price services? 
Allocative efficiency
Incumbent investment
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INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF REVENUES
‘HEAVIER’ INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC REGULATION 
LLU Inquiry 2003
– full LLU rejected on efficiency considerations (preservation 
of incumbent investment incentives for NGN
– limited access regulation (bitstream unbundling) to increase 
competition in broadband market (benchmarked using 
international TSLRIC prices)
– objective => increase broadband uptake (a proxy for 
consumer welfare)
– Telecom’ on notice’ to sell 250,000 connections (33.3% via 
competitors by December 2006
First bitstream products available September 2004
Did this have the desired effect?
New Zealand ADSL Market 2003-2006
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AN EFFICIENCY PROBLEM OR A 
COMPETITION PROBLEM?
Labour Party Manifesto (September 2005)
– “this Labour-led government has ended the destructive 
period of ultra-light handed regulation that stifled 
competition, growth and consumer choice in ICT markets”
– will “closely monitor and enforce commitments made by 
Telecom New Zealand under the local loop unbundling 
decisions and ensure targets for broadband uptake for the 
next three years as outlined in the Digital Strategy are met”
Speech from the Throne (November 9 2005)
– “with respect to ICT, my government will be advancing 
policies to ensure that the telecommunications sector 
becomes more competitive and that we achieve faster 
broadband uptake in line with our competitors”
STOCKTAKE 2006
Predetermines a ‘competition problem’
– does not address efficiency issues directly 
– recommendations to fully unbundle and impose operational 
separation based solely upon a desire to increase 
competition 
– regulatory Impact Statement says no cost-benefit analysis is 
necessary 
• all other regulatory recommendations (including 2004-7 Mobile 
Termination) backed up by CBAs using either total welfare or 
consumer welfare as the efficiency-based criterion
But what form of competition is it reasonable to expect 
in a small, distant, open economy such as NZ?
– dominant firm, competitive fringe on different infrastructures 
may be as good as it gets
– plus, oligopolistic markets re-emerging in rest of OECD
• how to manage/regulate interplatform oligopolies?
COMPETITION REPLACES EFFICIENCY AS 
PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF NZ REGULATION
Articulated in the 2nd Mobile Termination decision
Telecommunications Act uses different standard of test (consumer
welfare) from Commerce Act (total welfare)
– based on Commerce Act Part IV – regulation of existing market 
power
Primacy of competition over efficiency
“Where there is a tension between the net public benefits and promotion of 
competition, the statutory context indicates that the primary 
consideration is the promotion of competition … the 
Telecommunications Act is focused on regulating access to promote 
competition.  It does not provide a mechanism that specifically allows 
for efficiency considerations to take precedence over the promotion of 
competition.  Nor is there anything in the statutory scheme to suggest 
that this is the case”
THE PENDULUM HAS SWUNG BACK
Failing of competition laws circa 1986 to deliver most 
efficient outcome was the main criticism of the light-
handed regime
2005/6 decisions indicate that the tension must be 
resolved in favour of competition
The means has become the end
Implications for efficiency
– long term investment now doubtful in a market where there 
is only one (private) party with financial ability and 
demonstrated willingness (to date) to fully build out a fibre-
based NGN?
TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF SECTOR 
DIRECTION, CIRCA 1984?
February 28, 2006: 
– the Economic Development Minister (not Minister of 
Communications) announces that the mobile termination decision is 
being deferred whilst the Crown engages in a negotiation with 
Vodafone and Telecom
April 30 2007:
– 5 year agreement announced (Minister of Economic Development)
– effectively same outcome as Commission’s April 2006 (revised) 
recommendation
May 31 2007:
– Minister of Communications announces (in a speech) that 
he, not the Commissioner, will lead unbundling and 
separation processes
– new Commissioner announced in same speech
BUT ONLY 359 DEGREES
Structural separation, combined with LLU, all other 
manner of regulatory interventions is ideal for 
governments who used to own telcos.  They can still 
control sector decisionmaking just like they used to 
when they owned the firms, have, but bear none of 
the financial risks. But do they realise that they 
cannot force investors to fund new networks in the 
same way that they forced taxpayers to fund them in 
the past?  And do consumers?
Paraphrase from Greg Sidak’s keynote address, Network Neutrality 
Conference, Ecole Nationale Superior de Telecommuniques, Paris, 
May 31 2007
